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Abstract
In this paper, we present our line of research for deﬁning an integrated framework for the speciﬁcation
and analysis of security and trust in complex and dynamic scenarios. We aim at showing how the same
machinery applied for the formal veriﬁcation of security protocols may be useful to model and analyze trust
management procedures.
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1 Introduction
In pervasive and autonomous computing systems, security issues are in deep con-
tact with cooperation aspects. Indeed, these systems consist of diﬀerent entities
that have to cooperate and share resources to achieve a certain goal. On its turn,
cooperation is often related to trust, being the entities at stake more inclined to
collaborate with parties that they trust.
In this paper we focus on the integration of formal modeling and analysis of
security and trust. In particular, we present our framework to uniformly model
security protocols and some form of trust and reputation management procedures,
like Automated Trust Negotiation (ATN, [18]). We thus show that a strong con-
nection exists between methodologies used to establish, manage and negotiate trust
and the security mechanisms used to guarantee the conﬁdentiality and integrity of
information.
Formal theories, languages and tools have been successfully applied for the analy-
sis of network security. Exploiting formal methods, the protocol under investigation
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is described in a given language, then a formal speciﬁcation of the security property
to be analyzed is deﬁned.
In this framework, cryptography is usually modeled by representing encryptions
as terms of an algebra, e.g., mk may represent the encryption of a message m with a
key k. Usually, the inverse operation, decryption, can be performed only by knowing
the correct information, i.e., the decryption key.
Process algebras have been traditionally apply for modeling cryptographic func-
tions and powerful veriﬁcation techniques based on process algebras have been ex-
tensively used for analysis purposes. As an example, CCS, [14], has been equipped
with an inference construct that permits to infer new messages from others, i.e.:
[m1 . . .mn r x].P which denotes a process that tries to deduce a message m from
the messages in m1, . . . ,mn. The language is called Crypto-CCS ([9,11]).
Trying to unify trust features in a pre-existent framework already dealing with
security is particularly appealing for our aims. Indeed, when one analyzes a secu-
rity protocol, usually assumes that public keys, digital certiﬁcates, and generally
speaking credentials are already given, and does not usually check how these are
formated, negotiated and managed. Such a limited view seems not completely ap-
propriate for dynamic, fully interconnected systems, where entering some resources
may depend on credentials presented by users.
Also, dealing with trust and recommendation is a peculiarity of so called dynamic
coalitions, sets of electronic devices typically belonging to diﬀerent security domains,
and possibly driven by diﬀerent purposes, that should cooperate in order to maintain
active basic functionalities of the whole network.
Thus, inference constructs may be suitably used not only to cope with the variety
of diﬀerent crypto-systems that can be found in the literature, but also to express
trust towards others, by means of direct experience, or it can be used to infer trust
relationships through recommendations of third services.
Indeed, consider a set of credentials, i.e., (signed) messages containing some
information regarding roles, capabilities or rights that someone has. Assume that
{B, rf}A−1 means that the user A (via the signature with its private key pk
−1
A )
asserts B has capability to recommend a third party for doing a certain functionality
f . Also, assume that {D, f}B−1 means that B asserts (again, through its signature)
D has capability to do f . A rule like:
{B, rf}A−1 {D, f}B−1
{D, f}A−1
(rec)
may be used by A to ﬁnd some people (e.g., D) that is able to do f . Also we could
consider that each credential has a weight expressing the degree of trust of one
entity on the other for performing the function f . How trust values are calculated
depend on the speciﬁc inference rules.
Once we are able to model both security protocols and trust management policies
in a unique framework, we are also able to easily relate diﬀerent concepts. For
instance, we will formally show how the notion of privacy in trust negotiation is
related to a well known concept in security, i.e., non interference. Similarly, once
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could apply analysis methods developed for security protocols for trust management
problems and vice-versa.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section recalls the Crypto-CCS lan-
guage. In Section 3, we rephrase, in a formalization more suitable for our purposes,
the transitive trust model proposed by [5,6]. We show an extension by introducing
levels of trust and operators to combine them, according to the original intention
of [5]. Section 4 brieﬂy recalls the simplest language of the RT family of languages
for describing role-based credentials extended with measures as well as an encoding
of the simpliﬁed Josang’s model in the RT0. Section 5 gives hints to an imple-
mentation of the inference system with levels of trust for RT0 language. Section 6
shows how Crypto-CCS can model the systems presented in the above sections and
it gives an application example. Then, in Section 7, applications and results in the
ﬁeld of Automated Trust Negotiation are shown. Finally, Section 8 gives some ﬁnal
remarks.
2 Crypto-CCS
Here, we recall syntax and semantics of the formal language Crypto-CCS ([8,11]).
The language consists of a (parametric) data-handling part and a control part.
The data-handling part consists of a message set Msgs and a (parametric) infer-
ence system. The set Msgs is deﬁned by the grammar:
m ::= x | b | F 1(m1, . . . ,mk1) | . . . | F
l(m1, . . . ,mkl)
where m ranges over Msgs, F i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l) are the constructors for messages,
x ∈ V , a countable set of variables, b ∈ B, a collection of basic messages, and ki, for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, gives the number of arguments of the constructor F i. Messages without
variables are closed messages.
Inference systems model the possible operations on messages. These systems
consist of a set of rules as:
rule =
m1 . . . mn
m0
where m1, . . . ,mn are premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the conclusion. An
instance of the application of the rule r to closed messages m1, . . . ,mn is denoted
as m1 . . . mn rule m0. For each rule r and set of closed messages {m1, . . .mn},
we assume that the set {m | m1, ..,mn rule m} is decidable and that we can
eﬀectively establish whether it is empty or not.
The control part of the language deﬁnes terms standing for processes in a con-
current system. The terms are deﬁned as follows:
P,Q ::= 0| c(x).P | cm.P | τ.P | P |Q | P\L |
A(m1, . . . ,mr) | [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
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where m,m1, . . . ,mr are messages or variables, c is a channel and L is a set of
channels. Both the operators c(x).P and [〈m1 . . . mr〉 rule x]P ;Q bind variable x
in P .
We assume the usual conditions about closed and guarded processes, as in [14].
We call P the set of all the Crypto-CCS closed and guarded terms. The set of
actions is Act = {c(m) | c ∈ I} ∪ {cm | c ∈ O} ∪ {τ} (τ is the internal, invisible
action), ranged over by a. We give an informal overview of Crypto-CCS operators:
• 0 is a process that does nothing.
• c(x).P represents the process that can get as input a closed message m on channel
c behaving like P [m/x].
• cm.P is the process that can send m on channel c, and then behaves like P .
• τ.P is the process that executes the invisible τ and then behaves like P .
• P |Q (parallel) is the parallel composition of processes that can proceed in an
asynchronous way but they must synchronize on complementary actions to make
a communication, represented by a τ .
• P\L is the process that cannot send and receive messages on channels in L; for
all the other channels, it behaves exactly like P ;
• A(m1, . . . ,mr) behaves like the respective deﬁning term P where all the variables
x1, . . . , xr are replaced by the closed messages m1, . . . ,mr;
• [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q is the process used to model message manipulation as
cryptographic operations. Indeed, the process [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q tries to
deduce an information z from the tuple 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 through the application of
rule rule; if it succeeds then it behaves like P [z/x], otherwise it behaves as Q.
The set of rules that can be applied is deﬁned through an inference system (e.g.,
see Figure 1 for an instance).
Crypto-CCS syntax, its semantics and the results obtained are completely paramet-
ric with respect to the inference system used. Figure 1 shows an instance inference
system to model message handling and public key cryptography: it allows to com-
bine two messages, obtaining a pair (rule pair); to extract one message from a
pair (rules fst and snd); to digitally sign a message m with a key k
−1 obtaining
{m}k−1 and, ﬁnally, to verify a digital signature on a message of the form {m}k−1
by applying the corresponding public key k (rules sign and ver, respectively).
In a similar way, inference systems can contain rules for handling the basic
arithmetic operations and boolean relations among numbers, so that the value-
passing CCS if-then-else construct can be obtained via the rule operator.
Example 2.1 Equality check among messages can be implemented through the
usage of the inference construct. Consider, e.g., the following rule:
x x
Equal(x, x)
equal
Then, [m = m′]P (with the expected semantics) may be equivalently expressed as
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[m m′ equal y]P where y does not occur in A. Similarly, we can deﬁne inequalities,
e.g., ≤, among numbers.
The operational semantics of a Crypto-CCS term is described by means of the
labelled transition system (lts, for short) 〈P, Act, {
a
−→}a∈Act〉, where {
a
−→}a∈Act
is the least relation between Crypto-CCS processes induced by the axioms and
inference rules of Figure 2.
2.1 Security protocol analysis
The security protocol analysis proposed in [9,11] is based on the checking of following
property:
∀X s.t. S |X satisﬁes F
where F is a logical formula expressing the desired property. Often, when secrecy
properties are considered, F models the fact that a given message, i.e., the secret
to be veriﬁed, is not deducible from a given set of messages, i.e., the knowledge of
the intruder X acquired during the computation with S. The veriﬁcation of such
property requires the ability of computing the closure of an inference system, i.e.,
the possibility to iteratively apply the inference rules. Given a set R of inference
rules, we consider the deduction relation DR ⊆ Pfin(Msgs)×Msgs. Given a ﬁnite
set of closed messages, say φ, then (φ,M) ∈ DR if M can be derived by iteratively
applying the rules in R. Under certain sets of assumptions on the form of the rules,
we may have that DR(φ) is decidable (see, e.g., [10]).
3 The (simpliﬁed) transitive trust model (with mea-
sures)
In [12,13] we have given a formalization based on inference rules of the transi-
tive trust model proposed by Jøsang et al. (e.g., see [5,6]). The transitive trust
model in [5,6] has been introduced to model trust relationships towards perform-
ing a certain function/task or recommending someone else for performing a certain
function/task. As an example, one can denote A
f
−→ D the situation in which A
trusts D for performing function f , or A
rf
−→ D the situation in which A trusts
principal D for suggesting/recommending a third one for given task f . Here we
adopt a simpliﬁed version of this model where the recommender information is not
crucial.
In addition, the model can be naturally enriched with trust measures. In such a
way, credentials are enhanced in order to express not only the fact that a principal
trusts someone for performing f or for a recommendation, but also they specify the
degree of this trust. Then, by applying a rule, one can derive the trust measure of
the resulting conclusion by adequately combining the trust measures of the premises.
As an example, consider a credential enhanced with a trust measure, e.g., A
f,v
−→
B. This could be read as follows: A trusts B for performing f , with a certain degree
v. Thus, v gives the measure of how much A places conﬁdence in B. The extension
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m m′
(m,m′)
(pair)
(m,m′)
m
(fst)
(m,m′)
m′
(snd)
m k−1
{m}k−1
(sign)
{m}k−1 k
m
(ver)
Fig. 1. An example inference system for public key cryptography.
(inp)
m ∈ Msgs, m closed
c(x).P
c(m)
−→ P [m/x]
(out)
m ∈ Msgs, m closed
cm.P
cm
−→ P
(int)
τ.P
τ
−→ P
(\L)
P
c(m)
−→ P ′ c ∈ L
P\L
c(m)
−→ P ′\L
(|
1
)
P1
a
−→ P ′1
P1 |P2
a
−→ P ′1 |P2
(|
2
)
P1
c(x)
−→ P ′1 P2
cm
−→ P ′2
P1 |P2
τ
−→ P ′1 |P
′
2
(Def)
P [m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ P ′ A(x1, . . . , xn)
.
= P
A(m1, . . . ,mn)
a
−→ P ′
(D)
〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule m P [m/x]
a
−→ P ′
[〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
a
−→ P ′
(D1)
 ∃m s.t. 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule m Q
a
−→ Q′
[〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
a
−→ Q′
Fig. 2. Structured Operational Semantics for Crypto-CCS (symmetric rules for |
1
, |
2
and \L are omitted)
of the model with measures holds also for the credentials about recommendation,
i.e., notation A
rf,v
−→ B means: A trusts B for recommending someone else able
to perform f , with a certain degree v. Trust measures are hereafter denoted as
v, v1, v2, v3.
In [5,6], the authors suggest that there must be explicit rules for combining
trust measures either when dealing with transitivity of trust (e.g., when dealing with
chains of recommendation), or in presence of multiple paths (e.g., when dealing with
more recommenders recommending the same target), or when dealing with a chain
of recommendation followed by a credential recommending the functionality itself.
Thus, we consider two operators, namely the link operator ⊗ and the aggregation
operator , for combining the trust measures. Generally speaking, the former is
used to compose trust paths, while the latter is used to compare, select or aggregate
trust paths.
Below, we show a proposal for a model enriched with trust measures and rules
for combining them.
In particular, we deﬁne the link operator ⊗ over rule (3) transitivity and over
rule (4) functional trust via recommendation, while the aggregation operator
 is deﬁned over rule (5) aggregation and, more generally, in case of multiple
trust paths.
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A
f,v
−→ D (1)
A
rf,v
−→ D (2)
A
rf,v1
−→ B B
rf,v2
−→ D
A
rf,v1⊗v2
−→ D
(3) Transitivity
A
rf,v1
−→ B B
f,v2
−→ D
A
f,v1⊗v2
−→ D
(4) Functional trust via reccomendation
A
f,v1
−→ B A
f,v2
−→ B
A
f,v1v2
−→ B
(5) Aggregation
Rule (1) and (2) are the basic credentials of the model.
Rule (3) expresses the transitivity of a recommending chain, i.e., if A trusts
B for a recommending for a certain purpose with measure v1 and B trusts D
analogously, with measure v2, then A can directly trust D for recommending for
that purpose, with measure v1 ⊗ v2. Assume the interval [0, 1] of real numbers
with the usual multiplication operator, here denoted as ⊗, and the operator  that
returns the maximum between two real numbers. Suppose that A trusts B’s opinion
for recommending someone able to perform f , with a certain degree v1=0.8. Suppose
also that B trusts D as a recommender for f with degree v2=0.7. Then, conclusion
is that A can directly trusts D as a recommender with a measure v3 = v1 ⊗ v2,
where ⊗ can be, e.g., the product operator. In this case, v3 =0.56, according to the
intuition that trust is transitive but decreasing.
Rule (4) says that if A trusts B for recommendating a third one for doing f (with
measure v1) and B trusts D for performing f (with measure v2), then A trusts D
for performing f , with resulting measure 4 .
Finally, rule (5) gives a resulting measure combining two measures belonging to
the same target. As an example, suppose that A trusts B as a good cook, with two
possible measures, v1 and v2. Thus, A can maintain a single credential regarding B,
by combining the two measures according to some operator , e.g., A could simply
consider the maximum value between v1 and v2.
In order to have a coherent semantics, some conditions must be imposed on the
link and aggregation operators. The ﬁrst, natural, requirement is that ⊗, denoting
transitivity, must be associative, thus allowing to compute trust along complex
paths without taking care of the sub-paths evaluation order. Similarly,  must
be, in addition, also commutative, being the aggregation among two paths not
sensitive to operand order. Another desirable feature is that aggregation should
be idempotent. Some authors (e.g., see [16]) noticed that semirings, i.e., a triple
(M,,⊗), where  and ⊗ enjoy at least the previous properties plus additional
ones (as the distributivity of ⊗ over ), could be used as a starting point to model
trust operators. This is not a surprise, since these structures are commonly used for
4 This is a simpliﬁed version of the original rule that does not keep the information on the recommender,
thus resulting very similar to the rule 3.
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calculating weighted paths on graphs. Also an additional requirement could be that
trust degrades with links, thus requiring that m1⊗m2 ≤ m1,m2 for a suitable ≤. In
the following, we will use so-called c-semirings 5 that enjoy our desired properties.
Example 3.1 We give some speciﬁc examples of semiring-based trust measures.
Assume that we want to consider the path with maximal trust, then:
• ⊗ is the multiplication on real numbers (for instance between 0 and 1);
•  is the maximum between two real numbers.
We want to consider the path with the minimal weak steps in the trust paths:
• ⊗ is the minimum between two real numbers (for instance between 0 and 1);
•  is the maximum between two real numbers.
We want to consider the path with minimal number of steps in the trust paths:
• ⊗ is the sum on natural numbers;
•  is the minimum between two natural numbers.
4 RT0 with trust measures
In [7], Li et al. introduced the RT family of languages for managing and express-
ing trust relationships among entities. In the RT family of languages, credentials
carry information on policies to deﬁne attributes of principals by starting from
assertions of other principals. RT combines the strength of Role-based Access Con-
trol (RBAC), [15], by inheriting the notion of role, interposed in the assignment
of permissions to users, and of Trust Management, [3], by inheriting principles for
managing distributed authority through credentials.
Thus, in RT a central concept is the notion of role. A role is formed by a
principal and a role term. If principals are denoted as A,B,C... and role terms are
denoted as r, r1, r2..., then A.r is role term r deﬁned by principal A. A role may
deﬁne a set of principals who are members of this role, and each principal A deﬁnes
who are the members of each role of the form A.r by using speciﬁc credentials.
We give an extension of the simplest language of the RT family, i.e., RT0, with
trust measures (weights). We recall here the credentials and their meaning 6 . We
will also use the trust operators described in the previous section.
• A.r(v) ← D (simple member with measure)
The statement deﬁnes that D is member of role A.r with weight v.
• A.r ←v2 A1.r1 (simple containment)
A and A1 are possibly the same entities and r and r1 are possibly the same role
terms. With this statement, A deﬁnes all members of role A1.r1 with weight v1
to be members of role A.r with weight v = v1 ⊗ v2.
5 See, e.g., [2] for other applications of semiring based techniques to security analysis.
6 The notation is similar to the usual one for RT0 credentials, but the actual semantics should be clear
from the context.
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• A.r ← A.r1.r2 (linking containment)
This statement deﬁnes a linked role. If B has role A1.r1 with weight v1 and D
has role B.r2 with weight v2, then D has role A.r with weight v = v1 ⊗ v2. Note
that this works as a sort of role-based delegation.
• A.r ← A1.r1 ∩A2.r2 (Intersection containment)
This statement deﬁnes that if D has both roles A1.r1 with weight p1 and A2.r2
with weight v2, then D has role A.r with weight v = v1  v2.
4.1 Encoding the simpliﬁed transitive trust model with trust measures into (part
of) RT0 with measures
The simpliﬁed transitive trust model with trust measures can be encoded into RT0
with measures as follows:
simplified trust model RT0
with trust measures with trust measures
(1) A
f,v
−→ D A.f(v) ← D
(2) A
rf,v
−→ D A.rf(v) ← D
(3) A
rf,v1
−→ B B
rf,v2
−→ D
A
rf,v1⊗v2
−→ D
A.rf ← A.rf.rf
(4) A
rf,v1
−→ B B
f,v2
−→ C
A
f,v1⊗v2
−→ C
A.f ← A.rf.f
(5) A
f,v1
−→ B A
f,v2
−→ B
A
f,v1v2
−→ B
A.f ← A.f ∩A.f
5 An implementation of RT0 with trust measures
We present an algorithm for calculating a set of simple member credentials with
trust measures on RT0. It takes as input the credentials available, split in two sets,
the set of basic credentials and the others. If one does not consider trust measures,
the algorithm basically builds the minimal set of simple member credentials by
iteratively applying the inference rules for each kind of credential. If the inferred
credential does not belong yet to the set of computed basic credentials, then it is
added to this set. The procedure is iterated until no new credentials are found.
When the algorithm is applied to a ﬁnite set of credentials, it correctly terminates.
Adding weights is possible. As a matter of fact, due to the speciﬁc nature of
c-semiring we are going to apply, it can be also seen as a variant of the Floyd
algorithm for calculating minimal/maximal weighted paths among all the nodes in
a graph. Indeed, a simple member credential, say A.r(v) ← C, states that between
the node A and the node C there is an arc labeled r and with measure v. If we
assume the order ≤w among weights deﬁned as v1 ≤w v2 iﬀ v1  v2 = v2, then
the algorithm computes the greatest weighted path (w.r.t. ≤w) in the graph. We
remind that in c-semiring ⊗ is an inclusive operation.
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The algorithm is as follows.
Trust Calculations (basic creds, rules)= {
Results:=basic creds; Changed := true;
While(Changed) {
Changed:=false;
For each credential A.r ←v2 A1.r1 in rules and for each credential
A1.r1(v1) ← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v) ← C in basic creds with
not v1 ⊗ v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1 ⊗ v2) ← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
For each credential A.r ← A.r1.r2 in rules and for each credential
A.r1(v1) ← B, B.r2(v2) ← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v) ← C in basic creds with
not v1 ⊗ v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1 ⊗ v2) ← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
For each credential A.r ← A1.r1 ∩A2.r2 in rules and for each credential
A1.r1(v1) ← C, A2.r2(v2) ← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v) ← C in basic creds with
not v1  v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1  v2) ← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
}
6 Embedding in Crypto-CCS
The inference construct of Crypto-CCS can express the transitive trust model (and
clearly also the RT one), e.g., see [12,13]. We present an example of a Crypto-CCS
process that uses such rules.
Indeed, a basic credential of the transitive trust model and of RT0 (i.e., the
simple member credential) can be represented into Crypto-CCS as certiﬁcates of
the following form:
{D, f, v}A−1
In this formalization, A−1 is the private key of A.
We show the inference system that models the transitive trust model given in
Section 3.
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(1) {D, f, v}A−1
(2) {D, rf, v}A−1
(3)
{B, rf, v1}A−1 {D, rf, v2}B−1
{D, rf, v1 ⊗ v2}A−1
(4)
{B, rf, v1}A−1 {C, f, v2}B−1
{C, f, v1 ⊗ v2}A−1
(5)
{B, f, v1}A−1 {B, f, v2}A−1
{B, f, v1  v2}A−1
In all the credentials, the private key of principal x speaks for x itself. For
example, the term {D, f, v}A−1 says that A claims that D is trusted for performing
f with measure v. The way through which A guarantees for that assertion is the
signature that is aﬃxed. Indeed, as it is common in security protocols modeling
and analysis, it is assumed that the private key of a principal is never disclosed.
Thus, A was the unique able to generate such a signature.
Based on (1) and (2), one can express also transitivity of recommendation (3),
and rules (4) and (5).
Example 6.1 Consider the following scenario. An employer E starts the interviews
for engaging a new clerk. The criterion for the evaluation is as follows.
A candidate C must pass through an interview through which the employer
evaluates C’s capabilities in doing the work f . Thus, at the end of the interview,
E will trust C for performing f with a certain measure vE. This direct opinion of
E is expressed by the following credential: {C, f, vE}E−1.
Also, E requires a letter of reference coming from a previous employer PE. The
letter could be sent by e-mail directly from PE. It is digitally signed, in order to
prove its authenticity of origin, and it is expressed by the following formal form:
{C, f, vPE}PE−1 . The credential says that PE trusts C for doing f with measure
vPE.
We assume that the PE’s public key is publicly known. By accepting a letter
of reference from PE, E is making the following assertion: {PE, rf, 1}E−1, i.e., E
completely trusts PE for recommending someone able to perform f .
Thus, by applying rule 4 to premises {PE, rf, 1}E−1 and {C, f, vPE}PE−1, con-
clusion is {C, f, vPE}E−1, i.e., E has an indirect opinion about trusting C for doing
f via PE. Here, ⊗ is the product operator, and 1 is the neutral element, thus
vPE ⊗ 1 is vPE.
Currently, E has two possible measures of trust towards C, i.e., vPE and vE .
Through rule (5), E can compare the two measures by obtaining a ﬁnal level of
trust vPE  vE. Note that the criterion for the comparison is not explicitly deﬁned,
since it is up to E’s belief instantiating some particular operator for .
Finally, E decides to engage C if vPE  vE is greater (or equal) than a certain
threshold vt.
When there are many candidates, and more than one candidate goes over vt,
one may think to ask for another letter of reference. The one who has the highest
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value in this second letter wins the competition.
Now, we show the formalization of the procedure by using Crypto-CCS. The
entities at stake are represented as Crypto-CCS processes. For the sake of simplicity,
we consider the case with a single candidate.
The employer process is parameterized by the threshold value vt, by
{PE, rf, 1}E−1 and by the credential obtained after the interview, i.e.,
{C, f, vE}E−1. This last assumption is a modeling trick that totally bypasses the
candidate C in the model we are going to present. We justify this choice for the sake
of readability, since we are mainly interested in giving the ﬂavor of a Crypto-CCS
formalization and we simplify as much as possible the procedure.
Each conclusion xm of an inference construct is a message variable and it means:
variable x should contain message m.
E(vt, {PE, rf, 1}E−1 , {C, f, vE}E−1)
.
=
c?(xl). Receive the reference
[xl PE ver x(C,f,vPE)] V erify the signature
[{PE, rf, 1}E−1 xl 4 x{C,f,vPE}E−1 ] Apply rule 4
[x{C,f,vPE}E−1 {C, f, vE}E−1 5 x{C,f,vPEvE}E−1 ] Apply rule 5
[x{C,f,vPEvE}E−1 E ver x{C,f,vPEvE}] V erify the signature
[x{C,f,vPEvE} snd xvPEvE}] Extract xvPEvE
[xvPEvE} vt ≥ y] If vPE  vE ≥ vt then
cout!yes.0 success; else abort
The previous employer process is parameterized by the opinion about C.
PE({C, f, vPE}PE−1)
.
=
c!{C, f, vPE}PE−1 .0 Send the letter and stop
The whole Crypto-CCS process is deﬁned as
P
.
= PE({C, f, vPE}PE−1)||E(vt, {PE, rf, 1}E−1 , {C, f, vE}E−1).
7 Applications to Automated Trust Negotiation
Here we show how our machinery may help on studying security properties on Au-
tomated Trust Negotiation. Let the reader consider two users, a requester, trying to
enter a resource, and an access mediator, controlling the resource. There could be a
trust establishment phase where the two entities exchange some credentials in sev-
eral steps. During the exchange, the requester could not know exactly which kind
of credential to present, the access mediator could try to help him by prompting
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the access control policy for its resource, and, also, some user’s attributes stated in
the credentials used for the negotiation phase could be sensible. Thus, credentials
are managed like resources to be protected, and have their own access (disclosure)
control policies. This applies to both the requester and the access mediator. This
aspect of trust management is an active topic of investigation and it is called Au-
tomated Trust Negotiation (ATN, for short), e.g., see [4,17,18,19].
Since ATN actually deals with protocols for exchanging credentials, it seems
natural that it should be modeled in our framework.
In [18], a participant in a trust negotiation protocol is described through a
ﬁnite conﬁguration G = 〈KG, E, PolicyG, AckG〉, where: KG is the public key of
the participant; E is a set of credentials; PolicyG is a table where to each entry
corresponds a positive propositional logic formula expressing a disclosure policy for
attributes; AckG is a partial function mapping attributes to an entry in PolicyG.
Basically, a credential proving an attribute may be disclosed only if the attributes
presented by the other participants satisfy the corresponding (ack-)policy. The goal
is to protect attributes rather than credentials where these attributes are stated
(see [18] for a deeper discussion).
A negotiation strategy strat describes the behavior of each negotiator. A negoti-
ation starts when the requester sends a request to the access mediator and continues
by exchanging of messages. Each participant has a local state that keeps track of
the negotiation steps. We have two special states: failure, success. The negotiation
process fails when one of the two participants enters into the failure state. The
negotiation process succeeds when the access mediator enters into the success state.
Using Crypto-CCS, we may model the negotiation steps performed by a nego-
tiator starting in a conﬁguration G and using a strategy strat through a term of the
process algebra. Along with showing how to model negotiation strategies by process
algebras, [12] presented some results in relating a speciﬁc notion of non-interference
to some privacy issues discussed in [18].
Roughly, a negotiation that preserves privacy is a negotiation in which no ad-
versary, using observations it can make during the negotiation phase with the other
participant, may infer something about credentials proving attributes that it is not
entitled to know. The deﬁnition about privacy issues given in [18] depends on the
notion of the adversary strategy seq (a certain attack sequence) and on the notion
of the behavior of the other participant, given seq. A consequence of using our
formalism, equipped with a precise operational semantics and an abstract model of
cryptography, is that these notions come for free.
Indeed, let RelG,M be the set of credentials that can be safely disclosed (without
revealing non authorized information about attributes to an adversary M). Then,
an adversary should not be able to tell apart two conﬁgurations that are equal but
for the set of credentials not in the Rel set. We do not consider here the strategy
that will be used by M , but simply the set of credentials it has at the beginning
of the computation (this set is usually called initial knowledge of the intruder in
security protocol analysis).
According to [1], a protocol S(x) keeps secret the message x iﬀ for any message
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M,M ′ there is no attacker able to tell apart S(M) from S(M ′). This secrecy
property has been nicely modeled by exploiting an equivalence notion, called May-
Testing Equivalence. The notion states that two processes cannot be distinguished
by any process (tester). In our framework, it is possible to formally impose the fact
that the tester is not able to break cryptography and so to forge credentials. Let
us consider as testers only the ones with any credentials able to infer a ﬁxed set of
attributes. Eventually, one conﬁguration G and one conﬁguration G′ that have the
same Rel set and diﬀer on the credentials that cannot be released, may be analyzed
by using a single process AG,Rel(y) that has as parameter y the set of credentials
that cannot be disclosed. Thus, this amounts to check whether or not AG,Rel keeps
secret such credentials.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the possibility to use Crypto-CCS as a suitable mod-
eling language, not only for the standard capability of its inference rules to model
message exchange and manipulation, but also, and hopefully, for its expressiveness
in deﬁning, along with its native security features, credential chains, trust and rec-
ommendation relationships, access control policies based on credentials. This made
it very natural for us to model automated trust negotiation problems, as proposed
in [18], as non-interference ones.
As future work we plan at least to provide automated tools for security and
trust analysis as well as to deﬁne a fully integrated semantics with trust measures
for the whole RT family.
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